2026 Cryptocurrency Market Outlook: Embracing the Era of the "Web3 New Power"

Author: danny; Source: X, @agintender

In 2023, The Los Angeles Times once again ranked Indomie (Mie Sedaap) as the world’s most delicious instant noodles. This Indonesian fast food not only conquered taste buds from South Africa to London but also became a part of pop culture. However, behind each pack of cheap instant noodles costing just a few cents, lies a thrilling story of primitive capital accumulation and a modern business allegory about “power, capital, and monopoly.”

Introduction: From the World’s Best Instant Noodles

Indomie’s parent company Indofood is part of the Salim Group. Its founder, Liem Sioe Liong, was once Asia’s richest man. Born in 1916 in Fuqing, Fujian, China, Liem arrived in Java, Indonesia, in 1938 as a “piglet seller.” In his early years, he worked in his uncle’s grocery store. After initial primitive accumulation, he started engaging in businesses involving cloves and cigarettes. (Note: Indomie was actually acquired by Indofood.)

Cukong is a unique Indonesian term referring to Chinese businessmen who provide funding to political and military protectors in exchange for protection and monopoly privileges. Liem Sioe Liong’s “guardian angel” was Major General Suharto. During Indonesia’s independence war and subsequent military actions, Liem risked his life to supply food, medicine, and clothing to Suharto’s Fourth Military District through smuggling, establishing a physical “life-and-death” relationship—an interethnic and interreligious trust.

When Suharto seized power in 1966 and established the “New Order,” Liem Sioe Liong naturally became the regime’s economic engine—or rather, a trusted confidant of the president. Shortly after taking power, Suharto decided to shift Indonesia’s dietary habits from rice to noodles to address the domestic food crisis. However, at that time, Indonesia lacked the processing equipment, import channels, and US dollars needed for this task, which fell into Liem’s hands.

Suharto granted Liem exclusive rights to process wheat flour in western Indonesia. This was a priceless “imperial decree,” equating to having a printing press for money. However, although Liem had a “political license” to establish a monopoly enterprise, he lacked two critical resources: industrial manufacturing expertise and the huge capital required for heavy industry. This resource gap foreshadowed his intersection with Chen Bichen.

Building a modern flour mill—later PT Bogasari Flour Mills—required hundreds of millions of dollars. Despite the presidential order, Liem scoured Jakarta and Western banks, but the suited bankers looked at his empty balance sheet and shook their heads. To them, Liem was just a speculator without industrial experience or collateral, and Indonesia was merely a poor fishing village.

Just as the Bogasari project was about to die, Chin Sophonpanich, founder of Bangkok Bank, appeared.

As the godfather of Southeast Asia’s “Bamboo Network” capital, Chin had a keen sense of smell. Unlike Western banks that focused on Liem’s financial statements, he saw through the essence of this deal: Suharto’s political backing was the strongest collateral. Chin not only provided the huge startup capital needed to build the factory but also used Bangkok Bank’s international credit to issue a letter of credit for importing wheat.

This is what the article calls the “Chin Sophonpanich moment”—when capital no longer pays for the past (assets, founder’s experience, track record) but bets on monopoly structures and current political access.

With funding and technology in place, Bogasari quickly monopolized Indonesia’s flour market. The steady cash flow not only incubated several dominant enterprises but also brought the national brand Indomie into the fold, ultimately establishing Liem Sioe Liong’s business dynasty.

The Web3 industry in 2026 is experiencing a similar “Chin Sophonpanich moment.”

I. The Convergence of Centuries: The Process of Connection and the “Bamboo Network”

The relationship between Chin Bichen and Liem Sioe Liong is a product of Southeast Asia’s unique “Bamboo Network” business structure—two people connected through Malaysia’s “Sugar King” Robert Kuok, ultimately creating a grand business dynasty. (Note: The Bamboo Network is an informal business network among Chinese in Southeast Asia based on kinship, geography, and business ties, where reputation and trust are more important than contracts.)

In the late 1960s, although Liem Sioe Liong held the flour processing monopoly granted by Suharto, he knew nothing about modern flour industry technology. He urgently needed a technical partner. First, he approached Malaysia’s Kuok Hye Yian, who had already achieved great success in flour and sugar industries. Kuok not only provided key technical advice and channels but also connected Liem with Chin Bichen.

Chin Bichen prides himself on “knowing all important figures in the region.” During his exile in Hong Kong, he closely monitored regional developments. When Liem acted as Indonesia’s new president Suharto’s “agent,” Chin immediately recognized this pattern—similar to his early relationship with Thai generals.

Chin understood that Suharto needed an economic proxy, and Liem Sioe Liong was the chosen one.

II. Bogasari Flour Mill: Funding a Nation’s Granary

Founded in 1971, PT Bogasari Flour Mills is not only the flagship enterprise of the Salim Group but also the first and most important case study of strategic support from Bangkok Bank to Liem Sioe Liong. This was not just a commercial loan but an expansion of Indonesia’s geopolitical landscape.

2.1 Strategic Background: Wheat as a Political Stabilizer

By the late 1960s, Indonesia heavily relied on rice imports, with volatile prices that drained foreign exchange and threatened regime stability. Suharto sought to diversify the national diet by introducing wheat products (noodles and bread) to reduce dependence on rice. At that time, the US provided wheat aid through the PL-480 “Food for Peace” program, but Indonesia lacked the processing facilities for wheat.

Against this backdrop, Suharto granted exclusive rights to process wheat in western Indonesia (Java and Sumatra, covering 80% of the market) to Liem Sioe Liong.

2.2 Financing Challenges and the Absence of Western Banks

Building one of the world’s largest flour mills required hundreds of millions of dollars. Although Liem had some success in trade, raising such a sum in a short time was nearly impossible.

Western bankers viewed Indonesia as a high-risk country emerging from bloody coups and economic chaos. Liem was seen as a “clove merchant” without operational experience or credit history, with opaque balance sheets and insufficient collateral. According to traditional credit standards, this loan was impossible.

2.3 Bangkok Bank’s Intervention

While others hesitated, Chin Bichen stepped in decisively. Bangkok Bank provided the critical startup capital and working capital for the construction of the Jakarta Tanjung Priok Bogasari complex.

Chin’s assessment of this loan was not based on Liem’s financial statements but on the value of the “Suharto Franchise.” He understood deeply that with the monopoly decree (the National Logistics Agency Bulog was authorized to supply wheat exclusively to Bogasari, which would then process and buy back), this enterprise was essentially a printing press for money—unless the regime fell.

Suharto had vividly described Bogasari’s role as a “tailor”—the client (the state) provides fabric (wheat), the tailor makes suits (flour), and charges a processing fee. Bangkok Bank essentially securitized and discounted this government-backed “processing fee” cash flow. Chin’s insight was this monopoly OEM model: monopoly means pricing power, processing adds value, and both are profitable.

In addition to construction funds, Bogasari needed to import huge quantities of wheat from the US and Australia. Leveraging its reputation in international finance, Bangkok Bank issued vital letters of credit for these imports. Western suppliers might distrust the newly established Bogasari, but they trusted Bangkok Bank. Chin effectively used his bank’s credit to guarantee Liem’s import business.

2.4 Operational Success and Primitive Capital Accumulation

Supported by Bangkok Bank’s funds, Bogasari started production smoothly in 1971. It generated stable cash flow through processing fees and earned astonishing profits from selling by-products (bran and secondary flour)—per the agreement, these by-products belonged to Liem and could be sold as animal feed. The cash flow from Bogasari then fueled the expansion of the Salim Group into cement (Indocement) and banking (BCA).

III. Paradigm Reconfiguration: The “Chin Sophonpanich Moment” in the Web3 Context

What would this model look like if translated into 2026’s Web3?

1. Commodity: What matters is not what it is but who considers it important. In the 1970s, it was flour (Suharto could replace it with other foods); in 2026, it could be blockchain space, stablecoin liquidity, privacy, AI-enhanced efficiency, RWA, and other fields recognized and extended by giants using existing resources.
2. Political License (Backer): In 1960s Indonesia, it was Suharto’s executive order; in Web3, it’s compliance licenses and “investment cards.” US’s GENIUS Act, EU’s MiCA, Yzi’s incubation agreements, Coinbase Ventures’ investments, BlackRock’s support—these are the new “franchise licenses.”
3. The Financier: Today’s Chin Bichen is no longer Bangkok Bank but top asset managers or industry players like BlackRock, Coinbase, Binance, or Andreessen Horowitz.
4. The Operator: Today’s Liem Sioe Liong are the crypto-native giants who have “reconciled” with regulators, management, GPs, influencers, etc.

In 2026, successful Web3 projects will no longer be just decentralized protocols but sovereign economies (able to serve the giants’ sovereign businesses). This shift means that market competition in 2026 will no longer be about technological superiority but about capital efficiency and political resources—doing things that help giants expand influence and business is the new political correctness.

IV. Macroe Environment and Institutional Reforms: The Breeding Ground for New Oligarchs

In 2026, the Web3 industry is resonating within a triple cycle of global rate cuts, geopolitical restructuring, and regulatory framework implementation.

4.1 Rate Cut Cycle and Targeted Liquidity Injection

By 2026, major global central banks will be in a confirmed rate-cutting phase.

Liquidity Spillover Effect: As risk-free rates decline, capital seeks high-risk assets again. Web3, as a high-beta asset class, naturally attracts capital inflows.

Exclusive Institutional Channels: Unlike the retail-driven bull market of 2021, liquidity injection in 2026 will be highly targeted. Funds will flow through compliant channels—spot ETFs, compliant stablecoins (USDC, PYUSD), and tokenized funds (BUIDL)—rather than indiscriminately into altcoins.

4.2 Sound Regulation: The Legal Foundation of “Walled Gardens”

By 2026, regulation is no longer a looming Damocles sword but a solid wall that has been established.

Genius Act: The US has established a federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins, allowing only licensed entities to issue them. This effectively creates a high entry barrier, cementing the oligopoly of compliant issuers like Circle and Paxos.

Full Implementation of MiCA: The EU’s MiCA regulation imposes strict requirements on asset-backed tokens, severely restricting unlicensed offshore stablecoins’ survival in Europe.

4.3 Political-Business Integration: The Digital Extension of Dollar Hegemony

By 2026, Web3 technology is explicitly incorporated into national strategic competition. As issuer of USDC, Circle’s role increasingly resembles the Fed’s “digital shadow bank.” It holds large US Treasury holdings and actively complies with sanctions. This “politics-business integration” structure makes USDC not just a commercial product but an extension of national credit.

For individuals, standing out in this trio of forces is undoubtedly challenging.

4.4 The New “Shanzhai” Disappears at Launch

The 2024-2025 cycle saw many star projects and top-tier projects, mostly pre-emptively killed, crashed at launch, or failed to achieve big wins and had to drop out.

Careful observation shows that most projects launch in silence without backing from giants, without mainstream trading venues, without OG endorsements, or without using derivatives to kill competitors. The market has fallen into a state where the rising ceiling is dictated by liquidity providers, not by price performance. The era’s tears only leave behind attention, and the market has degenerated into a place where the “price” is just a reflection of liquidity.

V. 2026: The Year of Web3 Monopoly

If Bogasari flour mill was the physical cornerstone of Liem Sioe Liong’s empire, then in 2026, Web3 is seeking its “digital flour mill.” In this new cycle, the core logic of business has shifted from “technological innovation” back to the essence—obtaining monopoly and controlling pricing power.

5.1 The “Post-Disruptor”: Giants’ “Latecomer” Strategy

For giants like Binance, Coinbase, and BlackRock, they no longer need to be the first movers. Just as Liem Sioe Liong didn’t invent flour processing or create Indomie himself, Web3 giants don’t need to invent the latest DeFi protocols. (Yes, Indomie was acquired through capital and high-pressure tactics.)

For giants, whether it’s RWA, AI agents, or Meme tracks doesn’t matter. They have vast capital and user bases (“liquidity”) and can wait for the market to validate winning models. Then, through acquisitions, copying, or supporting “core” projects, they can leverage their scale to break market barriers and achieve “latecomer advantage.”

Between 2025 and 2026, M&A activity and proxy competitions in crypto surged. This is the giants clearing the battlefield. Medium-sized projects without giant backing risk marginalization or forced mergers.

5.2 Supporting Core Projects: Building Digital Moats

The main theme in 2026 is “strong alliances” and “internal incubation.” Giants are building closed ecosystems to keep profits within their walled gardens.

5.2.1 Binance’s Shadow Empire: YZi Labs and Aster

Binance cannot directly launch its perpetual derivatives DEX without provoking regulatory storms, so it adopts an “agent” strategy.

Rise of Aster: Aster is seen as Binance’s “core” in decentralized derivatives. Supported by YZi Labs (a spin-off from Binance Labs), it even received personal public investment backing from CZ.

Through Aster, Binance effectively channels its centralized exchange (CEX) market-making resources and liquidity onto the chain, creating a “shadow DEX.” This “front shop (Binance) and back factory (Aster)” model avoids regulatory risks while monopolizing derivative pricing on BNB Chain.

5.2.2 Coinbase and Circle: The Joint Venture of Dollar Hegemony

Coinbase’s relationship with Circle goes beyond partnership—it’s a deep equity tie.

Coinbase not only invested in Circle but also reached revenue-sharing agreements, jointly earning interest from USDC reserves.

This alliance grants USDC absolute exclusivity within the Coinbase ecosystem (including Base chain). Coinbase leverages its compliant entry point to aggressively promote USDC, effectively operating as a “digital Federal Reserve.”

VI. The Struggle of the Underprivileged: Great Opportunities Are Already Monopolized

6.1 Top Positions Backed by Exchanges: Exchange Public Chains and Digital Walled Gardens

The public chain landscape in 2026 shows a clear “Balkanization” trend. In the “Chin Bichen moment,” Bogasari was the physical carrier of monopoly profits. In 2026, backing exchange public chains is an extension of the “listing monopoly” of another exchange.

Coinbase and Base

Base is not fully decentralized but an extension of Coinbase’s governance. As the sole block proposer, Coinbase captures all on-chain Gas fees. Projects launched on Base or protocols supported by Coinbase Wallet are more likely to attract Coinbase’s listing attention.

Binance and BNB Chain

Binance plays a “central government” role on BNB Chain, supporting the ecosystem with massive subsidies. But if not on the “core” list, waiting for the protocol’s “golden moment” may be a long road.

6.2 Stablecoin Wars: Digital Flour and Monetary Sovereignty

If public chains are land, then stablecoins are the “flour” circulating on that land—its money-printing capacity is obvious. In 2026, the stablecoin market has experienced a reshuffle from “many to two giants,” leaving little room for ordinary players.

6.2.1 Regulation as a Moat: USDC’s Compliance Hegemony

Circle’s USDC has established its monopoly as the “onshore digital dollar” by 2026.

The symbiotic relationship between Coinbase and Circle: Coinbase invested in Circle and shares revenue from USDC reserves. Both share the interest income generated by USDC holdings and issuance. This deep integration gives Coinbase strong incentives to prioritize USDC promotion across all scenarios.

6.2.2 Offshore Resistance: Tether’s Golden Fortress

Facing USDC’s regulatory squeeze, Tether (USDT) took a different path in 2026—sovereign-level asset reserves.

In 2025, Tether held an astonishing $12.9 billion in gold reserves. By issuing gold-backed tokens, Tether effectively became a “shadow central bank” on blockchain, building a “digital Bretton Woods system.”

6.3 Powerhouses Alliance: RWA and Institutional Capital Colonization

BlackRock’s BUIDL Fund: A New Benchmark for DeFi

BlackRock’s BUIDL fund tokenizes US Treasuries, allowing qualified investors to hold and earn daily interest on-chain. Major exchanges like Binance plan to accept BUIDL as collateral for trading. This enables institutional traders to use interest-bearing assets (like Treasuries) as collateral instead of idle funds, greatly improving capital efficiency.

The rise of RWA signifies a fundamental change in token attributes. In 2020, most DeFi tokens were “governance tokens” with little value beyond voting rights. By 2026, RWA tokens are “yield-bearing tokens,” anchored to real-world cash flows. The narrative sounds promising, but it also means little to ordinary people.

VII. Conclusion and Outlook for 2026: Embracing the “Web3 New Oligarchy” Era

Looking back, Liem Sioe Liong’s rise from a clove seller to Asia’s richest was because he understood the “game” of that era—Suharto needed an economic pillar built on monopoly and financial leverage.

The Web3 industry in 2026 is at such a moment.

From Grassroots to Oligarchs

Those “crypto punks” trying to challenge regulation alone will gradually be marginalized. The stage belongs to those like Liem Sioe Liong—who understand how to dance with regulators, leverage the capital and “investment cards” of Chin Bichen (BlackRock/Coinbase/Binance).

From Selling Products to Selling Sovereignty

Business models are no longer just about developing protocols and earning fees. Instead, they involve building digital city-states (Base, BNB Chain), issuing digital currencies (Stablecoins), deploying AI agents, and controlling infrastructure to gain monopoly and supernormal profits. It’s not that cash flow isn’t attractive; giants want everything—not just the end cash flow.

This is a new mercantilist era ruled by code, driven by capital, and backed by endorsement. In this world, the stories of Liem Sioe Liong and Chin Bichen are not far away—they just wear different faces. The exchange and public chain insiders are the new Liem, Binance/Coinbase/BlackRock are the new Chin, and blockchain is their digital land for building the “new flour mill.”

It’s not that Web3 has no narrative; it’s that the narrative has shifted from chronicles to biographies.