The Hormuz Chess Game: From Historical Cycles to Great Power New Shadow Battles

1. Three Scripts in History

When Iran conveyed the "Ten Points" to the U.S. through Pakistan and refused to cease fire, the confrontation echoed through history. Over the past half-century, the Strait of Hormuz has staged three classic scripts.

The 1973 script was called "Embargo." Arab oil-producing countries used oil as a weapon, cutting off supplies to supporting Israel. The logic at the time was simple collective action: oil producers united, consumers panicked. This ultimately led to the creation of the International Energy Agency and strategic petroleum reserves, making Western countries realize for the first time that a single strait could shake the entire modern economic system.

The 1984 script was called "Oil Tanker War." During the Iran-Iraq War, both sides attacked each other's oil tankers, turning Hormuz into a battlefield. The U.S. and Soviet Union rarely dispatched escort fleets simultaneously, yet neither dared to open fire. It was a terrifying balance under the shadow of the Cold War—a fragile tacit understanding between two nuclear powers maintaining a dangerous equilibrium in a narrow waterway, with conflicts controlled within a gray zone that avoided full-scale war but was not entirely permissive.

The 2026 script is being written. The U.S. has threatened loudly to "open the Strait of Hormuz," Iran mockingly responds and issues ten points, with Pakistan acting as a messenger. On the surface, it resembles the 1984 Oil Tanker War: U.S. and Iran stand off, the strait is tense. But history has never repeated simply—the players on stage have changed, and the underlying logic of the script has been thoroughly rewritten.

2. The U.S.: From Protector to Conflict Actor

In 1984, the U.S., while supporting Iraq, maintained a relatively detached stance on the strait issue, sharing a form of "co-management" with the Soviet Union. By 2026, the U.S. is entirely different. After becoming a major global oil exporter, its dependence on Hormuz has significantly decreased. Yet, this has not made the U.S. more restrained—in fact, it’s more prone to risky actions because rising oil prices have less impact on the U.S. economy, and showing toughness remains effective politically.

Trump’s loud threats are not careless words but a carefully staged performance. His target audience is not Tehran but U.S. voters. However, this performance may boost his approval domestically, yet in the Persian Gulf, it signals danger. Iran perceives that the U.S. lacks a real strategy, only emotional threats. This reinforces Iran’s hardline stance, as it does not believe the U.S. dares to act decisively.

A deeper dilemma is that America’s alliance system in the Middle East is loosening. In 1984, Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait clearly sided with the U.S. But in 2026, these countries are engaging in direct dialogue with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran have restored diplomatic relations under Chinese mediation, and the UAE has adjusted its Iran policy. This means that if U.S.-Iran tensions escalate into a shooting match in Hormuz, the U.S. may not receive the full support of Gulf states as it did forty years ago.

3. Iran: From Isolated Player to Strategist

Iran’s role has also undergone profound change. In 1984, Iran was nearly isolated worldwide during the Iran-Iraq War, forced to endure alone. Today, Iran has multiple strategic footholds: it signed a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with China, plays a drone supplier role in Russia’s war economy, achieved a historic reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, and is a formal member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

These changes give Iran unprecedented confidence when facing the U.S. It communicates through Pakistan not because it fears direct response but to demonstrate: I can set the agenda. The specifics of the ten points are not public, but it’s reasonable to infer they include permanent sanctions relief, recognition of Iran’s regional role, security guarantees, etc. These conditions are unacceptable to Washington, but Iran is in no rush—believing time is on its side.

Another shift is Iran’s mastery of asymmetric information warfare. When Trump used coarse language, Iranian diplomatic missions did not retaliate with insults but responded with sarcasm, proverbs, and moral high ground. Quoting Mark Twain, criticizing "children who can’t accept losing," and appealing to American public dignity—these tactics are highly effective on social media, undermining the seriousness of U.S. threats and garnering international sympathy.

4. China: The New Variable of Great Power Politics

In 1984’s Oil Tanker War, China played almost no role. By 2026, China is Iran’s largest oil buyer, Pakistan’s "all-weather partner," a mediator in Saudi-Iran reconciliation, and an important destination for Gulf energy exports. China’s stance in the Hormuz crisis has become a focal point.

China’s interests are complex. On one hand, it needs stable oil prices to support manufacturing and economic growth, and it does not want the strait to be truly blocked. On the other hand, China prefers U.S. exhaustion in the Middle East, as that would divert U.S. resources globally. Therefore, China’s strategy is to call for restraint and dialogue publicly, while privately maintaining normal trade with Iran, and accelerating the development of yuan-denominated oil settlement and land-based energy corridors (like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) to reduce long-term dependence on the strait.

Pakistan, as a messenger, also reflects China’s indirect influence. Without China’s tacit approval, Pakistan would be unlikely to take on this role proactively. Through Pakistan, China maintains close ties with Iran, avoids direct confrontation with the U.S., and gains an important diplomatic foothold in the region.

5. Russia: Fueling the Fire Without Getting Burned

Russia plays a "beneficiary" role in the 2026 Hormuz game. High oil prices directly boost Russia’s war budget, while U.S. distraction in the Middle East eases pressure on Ukraine. Russia has strong incentives to encourage Iran to stay tough.

However, Russia also has red lines. It does not want a full-scale war in the strait, as that could cause oil prices to spiral out of control and trigger a global recession, ultimately harming Russia itself. Additionally, Russia maintains coordination mechanisms with Gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia) within OPEC+, and needs to sustain this cooperation. Thus, Russia’s stance can be summarized as supporting Iran’s diplomatic toughness but not backing military adventures.

6. Europe: Marginalized Stakeholder with Stakes

In 1973, Europe was the U.S.’s most steadfast ally, jointly responding to the oil crisis. In 1984, Europe followed the U.S. in escort operations. By 2026, Europe’s role has become blurred. There are divisions within Europe on Iran policy—France and Germany favor diplomatic engagement, while Eastern European countries lean closer to the U.S. stance. More importantly, Europe is preoccupied with energy crises and economic hardships following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, lacking unified action on Middle East issues.

However, once Hormuz truly faces crisis, Europe will be among the biggest victims. Despite reduced dependence, Europe’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil and LNG remains significant. A persistently tense Hormuz means high energy prices in Europe, further eroding industrial competitiveness. Therefore, Europe is pushing behind the scenes for diplomatic solutions, even attempting to bypass the U.S. to engage directly with Iran, with limited success.

7. Rhythms and Breaks in History

History does not repeat but rhymes. The 2026 Hormuz confrontation shares similarities with 1973 and 1984: a narrow waterway, several suspicious countries, and a tense situation that could spiral out of control at any moment. But the differences are even more significant.

The first difference is the shift in global power structure. 1973 was bipolar U.S.-Soviet, 1984 was a nascent unipolar world led by the U.S., and 2026 is a multipolar competition among the U.S., China, and Russia. Iran no longer faces a single "superpower opponent" but can maneuver among multiple great powers.

The second difference is the fluidity of alliances. The alliances in 1984 were relatively clear, but today, Saudi Arabia and Iran reconcile, the UAE normalizes relations with Israel, China maintains good relations with all Gulf states, and Russia cooperates with Iran but not fully aligned. There are no fixed friends or enemies—only shifting interests.

The third difference is the redefinition of energy itself. While the green transition has not yet completely changed the game, it has altered expectations. Countries recognize that the strategic value of oil will decline over the coming decades. This creates a countdown for Iran’s "strait card"—if not used today, it may be less valuable tomorrow. This urgency fuels Iran’s toughness and raises the risk of misjudgment.

8. Conclusion: Old Chessboard, New Players

Iran’s refusal to cease fire, its ten points proposal, its mockery of Trump’s coarse language, and its communication through Pakistan form a signal: Iran has learned to survive and profit in the gaps of great power rivalry. It is no longer the isolated warrior of 1984 but a regional player with multiple strategic backers.

The U.S. still commands the strongest military, but it has lost the cohesion and strategic patience it once had. Trump’s coarse words and subsequent proposals reflect America’s conflicted attitude in the Middle East: wanting to shed burdens but unwilling to admit decline.

China and Russia observe, wait, and quietly shape favorable situations. Europe anxiously seeks solutions but is overwhelmed.

The Strait of Hormuz remains narrow, but the players on both sides have changed several rounds. The old scripts are being torn apart, and new ones are yet to be written. Until the script is finalized, every oil tanker, drone, and every curse uttered could be the stroke that rewrites the ending.