The European decision-makers recently finalized a substantial aid package—providing approximately $105 billion in support to Ukraine over the next two years. The figure is enormous, averaging over $50 billion annually, enough to sustain the local government’s daily operations and some military expenditures. Interestingly, the EU initially planned to utilize assets of a major country frozen in Europe for this purpose, but ultimately this plan was not realized, and instead, they shifted to joint borrowing.

Why did they ultimately not dare to directly divert those frozen assets? The surface reason is straightforward—several rounds of negotiations failed to produce results. The country controlling most of the frozen assets was not persuaded, and other member states had their own concerns. Some worried about legal risks, some feared undermining trust in the region’s financial center, and others were concerned about retaliatory measures.

In the gray area of international financial law, directly using another country’s sovereign assets is a sensitive issue. If Europe were to do this, it could impact global investors’ confidence in euro-denominated assets. Countries and institutions that hold their money in Europe’s financial system might worry: Could my assets also be frozen and diverted? This could undermine Europe’s status as an international financial safe haven. On the other hand, the opposing side holds countermeasures—such as freezing European assets locally, further disrupting energy supplies, or even launching more complex hybrid warfare tactics.

These uncertainties make it difficult for the EU to present a unified stance. However, a leading figure of a major European political force recently sent a clear signal: the EU will ultimately use those frozen assets. This is not just politeness but a declaration of political direction. Since they couldn’t cut into the principal this time, they will start by leveraging income and interest from the frozen assets—using the income generated to support loans or using the assets themselves as collateral. This approach avoids the legal risks of outright confiscation while demonstrating internally and to the involved country that “the money ultimately comes from there.”

More notably, Europe is institutionalizing this mechanism. From freezing → income utilization → possibly eventually using the principal, the entire process is being gradually laid out. Europe is playing a long-term game.

Is $105 billion enough? If it’s just for government operations, paying wages, and maintaining social security, this amount can fill many gaps. The local government is unlikely to face a short-term funding cutoff or operational halt. But to wage a high-intensity war? Far from enough. Modern warfare consumes more than just cash. Ammunition, air defense systems, equipment wear and tear, infrastructure repairs, energy security—these are sometimes not purchasable even with money, because supply chains, capacity, and delivery cycles are the real bottlenecks.

Especially against the backdrop of increasing uncertainty in U.S. support policies for Ukraine, whether European military industries can ramp up production quickly, and whether air defense ammunition can be delivered in time, directly affects how long the front lines can hold. This money is more like a life-support fund, allowing the situation to be maintained but not guaranteeing eventual victory.

Europe is firmly committed to continuing support for Ukraine, but the methods are changing—from direct grants to loans, from one-time allocations to phased disbursements. Most importantly, from temporary political decisions to institutionalized long-term arrangements.

Europe is turning this into a “sustainable, controllable, internally justifiable” long-term project. This reflects a deeper reality: the relationship between a major country and Europe has entered a long-term confrontation phase. Europe will not abandon support due to a single negotiation setback, nor will it proactively lift sanctions because of high costs. Freezing assets, maintaining sanctions frameworks, and providing ongoing aid have evolved from stopgap measures into the fundamental policy stance of Europe toward that country.

Diversification of energy sources is accelerating, defense spending continues to rise, and measures to prevent intelligence infiltration are being strengthened. Once these changes are institutionalized, they will be difficult to reverse in the short term. Europe has already positioned this country as a long-term strategic threat.

Unless there is a fundamental regime change, a major strategic shift, or a systemic collapse of the economy or military system—breakthrough changes—Europe is unlikely to revert to the pre-war state of both economic and trade interactions while maintaining strategic ambiguity.

The confrontation between the two is no longer a short-term friction that can be eased in a few years but a fundamental line in the international order over the next ten to twenty years. How this line evolves will not only determine the future of the region but also profoundly reshape the global geopolitical landscape, energy supply patterns, and the future trajectory of the international financial order.