US military bases, "bombed all over"

Source: China News Weekly

Abandon or Keep?

The military conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has lasted nearly three weeks, with U.S. military bases in Gulf countries suffering systematic strikes.

Public information shows that the U.S. has at least 19 military facilities in the Middle East, including 8 permanent bases. These densely deployed bases are key points for the U.S. to maintain its military projection capabilities and consolidate regional dominance. From Qatar’s Udeid Military Base, the largest U.S. military base and forward command of CENTCOM, to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, the Zafar Air Base in the UAE, Ali Salim Air Base in Kuwait, and Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, all core bases have been hit multiple times, with none spared.

This was originally a war Gulf countries desperately wanted to avoid. However, when Iran’s missiles and drones tore through the Gulf skies hitting U.S. bases and local infrastructure, a fundamental question emerged: since the U.S. cannot fulfill its promise to protect Gulf security, how should these countries, which have hosted U.S. bases for decades, reassess and adjust this unequal alliance?

On March 7, the remains of six fallen U.S. soldiers arrived at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. On March 1, Iran’s drones attacked a U.S. command center in Kuwait, killing six U.S. soldiers.

From “Protector” to “Firing Point”

CNN confirmed via satellite images that at least five radar sites in this round of conflict were struck and damaged. According to the Islamic Republic News Agency on December 12, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Commander Jafari stated that 70% of U.S. military bases in the Middle East had been destroyed. Regarding casualties, as of March 15, the U.S. admitted to 13 deaths and dozens of injuries, while Iran claimed to have caused 650 U.S. military casualties.

U.S. equipment losses are also severe: five KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft at a Saudi base were hit and damaged by missiles; another refueling aircraft crashed in western Iraq; three F-15Es in Kuwait were shot down by friendly fire; Iran shot down a U.S. F-15 fighter jet. Additionally, Iran repeatedly claimed to have launched missiles at the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier and hit it successfully, which the U.S. denied.

Beyond military targets, Iran has also attacked civilian facilities such as oil fields, airports, and hotels in Gulf countries to varying degrees. Iran has also taken control measures in the Strait of Hormuz, aiming for dual deterrence: first, warning Gulf countries not to support U.S. attacks; second, spreading the conflict across the region to create regional instability and a global energy crisis, pressuring Gulf nations to push the U.S. to cease military operations.

The anger of Gulf countries stems from being completely excluded from war decision-making, becoming passive victims caught in the conflict. Multiple authoritative reports confirm that weeks before the conflict, Gulf countries repeatedly urged the U.S. to exercise restraint and resolve disputes diplomatically. Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi even met with U.S. Vice President Vance the day before the attack, warning of the serious consequences of reckless military action. However, the Trump administration launched airstrikes without informing any Gulf allies, directly pushing these “partners” into Iran’s firing range. The Associated Press quoted anonymous officials saying Gulf leaders are extremely angry that the U.S. military failed to adequately protect them, believing the U.S. prioritized Israel’s security over Gulf safety.

For decades, Gulf countries have played the role of “loyal allies” to the U.S., allowing American military bases on their territory and becoming some of the largest buyers of U.S. weapons and technology. In return, the U.S. promised to be the most reliable military partner and security protector in the Gulf region. During Trump’s 2025 Middle East visit, Saudi Arabia pledged to invest $600 billion in the U.S., the UAE committed to $1.4 trillion over ten years, and Qatar signed cooperation agreements worth $243.5 billion; the same year, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed the largest-ever military sale worth nearly $142 billion, covering air force upgrades, missile defense, maritime security, and more. Subsequently, the U.S. approved another $9 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, further deepening the “economic-for-security” relationship. However, when the conflict erupted, this seemingly solid deal failed to provide adequate security.

Doubts about U.S. security commitments have existed for years. In 2019, the Trump administration failed to respond to the attack on Saudi oil facilities; in 2022, the Biden administration also did not effectively respond to Houthi attacks on the UAE. In September 2025, Israel launched an airstrike on Qatar, and U.S. military bases in Gulf countries faced attacks with no interception. These old wounds were torn open again, revealing that key Gulf states cannot prevent Trump’s radical ideas of regime change in Iran. On critical regional security issues, Gulf countries have limited influence over U.S. policies.

Limited Options for Breakthrough

Faced with this imposed war, Gulf countries have shown rare unity and restraint, taking pragmatic measures:

First, they explicitly refuse to participate in military actions. UAE Foreign Minister Reem Al Hashimy emphasized, “The UAE is committed to ensuring regional peace, stability, and security through responsible dialogue and diplomacy, avoiding military confrontation and catastrophic escalation.” Second, they issued statements condemning Iran’s strikes but focused on urging all parties to stop escalating the conflict and de-escalate tensions. Third, they fully strengthen their defenses, especially protecting oil fields, airports, and critical infrastructure to prevent further attacks. Fourth, they continue behind-the-scenes pressure on Washington, demanding the U.S. end the war quickly and reduce regional impact.

At the UN level, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman collaborated to garner support from 135 countries, passing a resolution condemning Iran’s retaliatory strikes and seeking to leverage international pressure to ease tensions.

However, whether these efforts will succeed remains uncertain. Before the conflict, Oman hosted multiple indirect talks between Iran and the U.S., and held technical consultations in Vienna involving European representatives to facilitate communication. After the outbreak, Western countries initially expected Iran to collapse quickly under the first strikes, but Tehran demonstrated unexpected resilience, employing asymmetric deterrence tactics that hindered Gulf mediations and pressures.

On March 14, Iran’s senior Revolutionary Guard commander Muhsin Rezaei stated that there are two conditions for ending the war: Iran recovers all losses, and the U.S. leaves the Persian Gulf.

[Image: Visual China]

Accelerating the “Established Agenda”

Gulf countries have long pursued a “hedging strategy,” maintaining economic interdependence with Iran and security ties with the U.S., trying to maximize their interests amid great power competition. Iran is the UAE’s second-largest trading partner, with trade reaching $28.4 billion in 2024; Qatar shares the South Pars gas field with Iran, which supplies 70% of Iran’s natural gas, and their energy cooperation is close. This “hedging strategy” was once seen as pragmatic.

However, the current conflict shattered that illusion. Economic interdependence did not prevent Gulf countries from being drawn into the conflict. More importantly, Gulf states are also practicing “hedging” in technology: seeking to develop AI using foreign technology and capital, while strengthening “AI sovereignty” to reduce reliance on a single foreign tech pathway.

In the future, Gulf countries will accelerate diversifying their security partnerships: possibly deepening relations with Russia, Europe, India, and other major powers; diversifying arms sources; and gradually building autonomous deterrence capabilities less dependent on external allies. Some analysts say Gulf states will not act quickly or find immediate U.S. alternatives, but are likely to continue advancing strategic autonomy—“this conflict will accelerate these established agendas.”

Reshaping Cooperation Models

Will Gulf countries give up U.S. military bases? The answer may be: not immediately, but the cooperation model will undergo fundamental restructuring.

For decades, the U.S. has collected trillions of dollars from Gulf countries, claiming to provide security. Yet, within ten days of Iran’s missile attacks, the U.S. took no substantive action. Countries like the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain are now experiencing huge shocks.

The Gulf’s situation is eerily similar to Europe’s. When Russia invaded Ukraine, European countries realized that relying solely on the U.S. was insufficient for their protection, and that the U.S. was not truly committed to defending them; now, Europe is urgently seeking autonomous security solutions. Similarly, Gulf countries have seen clearly that the U.S. will not truly pay for their security, leaving Europe and Gulf states isolated—either because the U.S. is unable or unwilling to protect them. This rift has already shaken the foundations of the post-World War II global order.

The 2026 conflict has also thoroughly rewritten the old “oil for security” order. U.S. bases are no longer a “protector” for Gulf countries but have become a burden that invites trouble. Going forward, Gulf states will need to adopt more cautious and balanced strategies in their relations with Iran, the U.S., and other major international partners. This is no longer just an option but a necessity for their survival and development.

Long-term, Gulf countries face dual challenges: first, to handle Iran’s post-war stance—whether it wins or exhausts itself and withdraws; second, to absorb domestic anger towards the U.S. and Israel, and reshape their security and prosperity contracts to accept existing alliances. As prominent Emirati businessman Khalaf Habbour questioned, “If this strike was meant to contain Iran, did they consider the regional impact? Or did they ignore the cost of dragging the Gulf into a conflict in which they are not a party?”

(Author: Yang Yuxin, Assistant Research Fellow at Zhejiang Normal University’s Africa Research Institute, Director of the Center for Arab-African Studies)

Author: Yang Yuxin

Editor: Xu Fangqing

Operations Editor: Xiao Ran