High Growth Myth Ends, Can Aimee's M&A Gamble Support the Next Decade?

Once celebrated as the “Beauty Medical King” in the capital market, Aimeike, once held aloft as a god, delivered a shocking report card in 2025.

According to the annual report released on the evening of March 19, this company, known for its rapid growth, posted revenue of only 2.429 billion yuan in 2025, a year-on-year decline of 19.62%. Its net profit attributable to shareholders plummeted from 2.02 billion yuan the previous year to 1.235 billion yuan, a drop of 38.86%. Basic earnings per share fell from 6.5 yuan to 4.28 yuan.

This marks the first time since its listing in 2020 that Aimeike experienced negative growth in both annual revenue and profit. The high-growth story that saw revenue doubling in 2021 and years of double-digit growth, igniting investor enthusiasm, seems to have come to an abrupt end this year.

The financial report shows that from 2015 to 2023, Aimeike experienced a series of dizzying growth miracles: annual growth rates reached 58.09%, 44.28%, 73.74%, 27.18%, 104.13%, 33.91%, and 47.99%. Over these nine years, the company’s compound annual growth rate (CAGR) was as high as 47.6%, with revenue soaring from 112 million yuan in 2015 to 2.869 billion yuan in 2023, demonstrating explosive growth.

Core Products Stumble Collectively

Once upon a time, “Hi-Body” was Aimeike’s cash cow. This product, focused on neck wrinkle correction, held near-monopoly status in its niche market thanks to its exclusive advantages, contributing the majority of the company’s revenue. However, in 2025, solution-based injection products (mainly the Hi-Body series) generated 1.265 billion yuan, accounting for 51.57% of revenue, a year-on-year plunge of 27.48%. Sales dropped from 6.3463 million units to 5.1225 million units.

Worryingly, gel-based products like “Ru Bai Angel,” seen as the second growth curve, also performed poorly. Gel injection products earned 890 million yuan, accounting for 36.27% of revenue, down 26.82% year-on-year, with sales decreasing from 893,600 units to 696,400 units.

The simultaneous slowdown of these two core product lines directly exposes Aimeike’s growth dilemma. The previous model of relying on a single blockbuster is no longer sustainable in the increasingly competitive medical aesthetics market.

Gross profit margin remains high at 92.71%, but down 1.95 percentage points from 2024. Solution products’ gross margin was 93.11%, down 0.65 points; gel products’ gross margin was 97.32%, down 0.66 points. Amidst significant revenue decline, the slight decrease in gross margin seems to reflect intensified industry competition.

Rigid Sales Expenses and Profit Margin Squeezed

Interestingly, despite a sharp decline in product sales, Aimeike’s sales expenses increased rather than decreased, reaching 214 million yuan in 2025, up 4.5%. This indicates that the company is increasing marketing efforts to maintain market share, but the results are not ideal.

Direct sales channel revenue was 1.406 billion yuan, a sharp drop of 29.98%; distributor channel revenue was 1.047 billion yuan, a slight increase of 2.84%. Clearly, Aimeike is adjusting its channel strategy, trying to offset the decline in direct sales through distributor networks. However, the gross margin of the distributor model (89.69%) is significantly lower than that of direct sales (94.93%), which will further compress profit margins.

In terms of R&D, Aimeike invested 238 million yuan, up 2.2%, with the proportion of revenue rising to 9.8%. Maintaining R&D investment amid performance pressure is commendable, but short-term results are unlikely to improve significantly.

High-Stakes Acquisition of Korea’s REGEN: Internationalization or Takeover?

Facing domestic growth bottlenecks, Aimeike has turned to overseas markets. In March 2025, the board approved the acquisition of a controlling stake in Korea’s REGEN Biotech, Inc. The deal was completed by the end of the year, with goodwill soaring from 278 million yuan at the start of the year to 1.641 billion yuan, an increase of nearly 1.4 billion yuan.

REGEN’s products include AestheFill (polylactic acid facial filler) and PowerFill (polylactic acid body filler). Aimeike clearly hopes to replicate the success of “Hi-Body” by introducing these two products into the Chinese market.

However, the 1.4 billion yuan goodwill implies a very high premium. If integration falls short of expectations or the products do not adapt well to the Chinese market, massive goodwill impairment risks loom like the Sword of Damocles.

The financial report shows that at the end of 2025, Aimeike’s long-term payables increased by 221 million yuan, mainly related to the acquisition, adding future financial burdens.

From cash flow data, net cash flow from operating activities in 2025 was 1.324 billion yuan, a decrease of 31.29% year-on-year, indicating mounting collection pressures.

Meanwhile, there is an unresolved “legal minefield” behind this acquisition—the exclusive distribution rights for the core product “AestheFill” (commonly known as “Youth Needle”) in mainland China are still contested. The dispute with the original exclusive distributor, Datuo Medical Devices (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. (a subsidiary of Jiangsu Wuzhong), remains unresolved. Until this legal issue is settled, Aimeike faces significant uncertainty in acquiring and monetizing this key asset.

Industry Shift: From Blue Ocean to Red Ocean

Aimeike’s predicament is essentially a microcosm of the entire medical aesthetics industry shifting from a blue ocean to a red ocean.

According to the referenced “China Medical Aesthetics Industry 2025 Insight Report,” consumer willingness for injection procedures remains high, but competition has evolved from single-product rivalry to ecosystem competition. More players are entering, with hyaluronic acid and regenerative products facing serious homogenization and price wars.

Previously, Aimeike could dominate with “Hi-Body” alone, thanks to its exclusivity. But now, competitors are launching similar products, and the neck wrinkle correction market’s moat is being eroded.

More critically, regulatory tightening is unprecedented. The media spotlight has exposed industry chaos, especially during this year’s CCTV “3.15” evening show, which revealed rampant “three-no” products (no license, no quality, no safety), false advertising, fake certifications, illegal additives, exaggerated claims, and gray operations like “using fake certificates” and “co-branding.”

Under this high-pressure environment, the National Medical Products Administration has significantly raised approval thresholds for Class III medical devices, increasing compliance costs for companies. Meanwhile, consumer awareness is rapidly awakening. Platforms like Xiaoyao and others are educating and supervising, making blind pursuit of high-end brands a thing of the past. Consumers now scrutinize ingredients, compare prices, and prioritize “cost performance” over brand prestige.

What Lies Ahead?

In response to these challenges, Aimeike has taken some actions.

On the product front, it launched “Suo Kela” (a cross-linked hyaluronic acid gel with polyvinyl alcohol microspheres for chin retrusion). Its wholly owned subsidiary, NoboTe, obtained a registration certificate for minoxidil topical solution, entering the hair loss treatment market. In January 2026, its exclusive injectable botulinum toxin type A received drug registration approval, building a comprehensive facial product system of “fillers + botulinum.”

In marketing, Aimeike is pushing digital transformation, building three major data platforms: customer center, user center, and content center, aiming to improve efficiency through refined operations. The “QuanXuan Classroom” has served over 30,000 certified doctors and accumulated more than 2,000 academic content items.

However, whether these measures can reverse the decline remains uncertain.

New product launches require time; minoxidil faces fierce OTC competition, and botulinum toxin is dominated by giants like Allergan. Digital investments are slow to show results, and competitors are also investing heavily. Most critically, the integration after acquiring REGEN has been underestimated—cross-border mergers involve cultural integration, channel synergy, and product localization, all challenging hurdles.

Qingyang Jun’s Sharp Commentary:

Aimeike’s 2025 marks the end of an era.

The era of relying on a single blockbuster, ultra-high margins, and reckless growth to succeed is over. The medical aesthetics industry is returning to its core: product strength, brand power, operational efficiency, and globalization—none can be missing.

The 1.4 billion yuan goodwill gamble is a desperate move that could either lead to a new growth curve or plunge into a deep abyss. If REGEN’s products succeed in China, Aimeike might open a second growth phase; if not, impairments and declining core business could have dire consequences.

For investors, it’s time to reassess the company’s valuation logic. The once-glorious “medical aesthetics king” halo has faded; today’s Aimeike is just an ordinary medical device company facing growth bottlenecks and difficult transformation.

The road ahead will not be smooth. In an era dominated by appearance economy, merely storytelling is no longer enough to keep consumers paying.