US Coal Enterprise Ventures into Rare Earths! Ramaco(METC.US) Partners with Japanese Company to Advance "Americanization" of Rare Earth Industry Chain

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Large U.S. coal producer Ramaco Resources Inc (METC.US) announced that the company is in discussions with some major Japanese rare earth industry and trade companies regarding potential supply agreements for rare earths mining in Wyoming. This move highlights the growing domestic demand for rare earths in the United States amid the broader context of U.S.-China geopolitical competition. The Trump administration is elevating rare earths from a resource issue to a strategic industrial chain project, and this rare earths boom in the U.S. is even prompting coal mines to cross over and bet on the rare earths supply chain.

Since 2025, the U.S.-China competition over chips and rare earths has intensified. Under Trump’s leadership, the U.S. government has unprecedentedly supported the expansion of U.S. rare earth ore and magnet production, aiming to achieve a fully independent domestic rare earth supply system.

It is understood that since 2025, the Trump administration has partnered with American tech giants like Apple to support large orders for MP Materials (MP.US), a major U.S. rare earth company that owns the Mountain Pass rare earth mine. Since its listing in 2020, MP Materials’ stock has mostly been at historic lows, but it has now entered an unprecedented bull market, with a 300% surge since 2025 and multiple new all-time highs. The stock price rally reflects more than just price or order stimulation; it indicates that demand from sectors like semiconductors, military, permanent magnet motors, and advanced manufacturing for non-Chinese rare earths (000831) is being amplified by policy and capital.

Last Friday, Ramaco Resources CEO Randall Atkins said in an interview in Tokyo that the company has held talks with some firms to explore how they might participate in Ramaco’s large-scale Brook Mine project in the western U.S. He mentioned discussions covering off-take agreements, direct investments, and technical cooperation.

Atkins named Japanese companies Sumitomo Corporation and Iwatani Corporation as representatives Ramaco has contacted. Sumitomo declined to comment, while Iwatani did not respond to requests for comment.

Rare earths are critical minerals globally, widely used in high-tech manufacturing, including electric vehicles, smartphones, and powerful magnets used in military missile systems. Japan, the U.S., the UK, and other Western countries are all working to reduce dependence on Chinese rare earths. China’s long-standing dominance in most processing stages of the global rare earth supply chain gives the Chinese government a key bargaining chip in last year’s high-profile trade war with the U.S., comparable to advanced chip manufacturing.

Shortly afterward, China banned exports of dual-use military and civilian products—particularly including rare earths—that could have military applications to Japan.

Atkins said Ramaco is actively developing the Brook Mine, an old coal deposit that also contains rare earth elements like neodymium and terbium, as well as other critical minerals such as gallium, which Western countries are interested in. The company is currently conducting a preliminary feasibility study, aiming to complete it by the end of 2026.

He added that deep and active cooperation with Japanese companies could align with the $100 billion trade agreement reached between the Trump administration and Tokyo, which requires Japanese private or state-owned enterprises to invest $550 billion in U.S. projects.

Why is the U.S. eager to achieve “de-Chinese” rare earth supply chains?

Rare earth elements, especially neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium, are core materials for high-performance permanent magnets, which are critical components in missiles, aircraft, submarines, satellites, unmanned systems, electric vehicles, motors, and high-end industrial equipment.

Recent public statements by the U.S. government have been very direct: the U.S. is overly dependent on imports for rare earth permanent magnets, with domestic production only meeting a small part of defense needs. Even if ore can be mined domestically, reliance remains if separation, refining, and magnet manufacturing are still controlled abroad, posing security risks. In other words, the U.S. aims to eliminate vulnerabilities not just in “mines,” but across the entire chain—from mining, separation, metallurgy, magnet production, to end-use applications.

In the broader context of U.S.-China rivalry, controlling the entire rare earth industry chain has proven to be a highly effective geopolitical weapon. China holds an overwhelming advantage in rare earth processing and related manufacturing. According to the International Energy Agency, China accounts for up to 90% of refining of key minerals, including core rare earth mines; CFR studies further indicate that China controls most heavy rare earth processing and permanent magnet manufacturing capacity.

Over the past year, China has imposed export bans on dual-use military and civilian products to Japan and has included rare earths in highly sensitive trade restrictions. Media reports suggest Japanese companies are feeling significant manufacturing pressure. For the U.S., this serves as a reminder: without dominant control over refining and magnet production, the U.S. semiconductor, military, automotive, power equipment, and advanced manufacturing sectors could be long-term “bottlenecked” in geopolitical conflicts.

From a financial market perspective, rare earths are no longer just cyclical commodities but are now strategic assets priced by geopolitical premiums, military premiums, and supply chain security premiums. If global geopolitical conflicts escalate significantly, the U.S. may not just lack rare earth mines but also face a loss of independence and certainty across its entire industrial system.

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