Interface Investigation | How Did Mei Xiangron Transform Yingke from "Universe's Largest Firm" into a "Money-Sucking Black Hole"?

What is the underlying risk behind AI · Yingke Financing Contract Changes?

Ji Mian News Reporter | Sun Yizhen, Zhao Meng, Wang Zhen

Ji Mian News Editor | Song Yejun

Known as the “Universal Law Firm,” Yingke Law Firm (hereinafter “Yingke Law Firm”) is currently embroiled in a financing crisis triggered by former director Mei Xiangrong.

Recently, Ji Mian News investigation found that the financial risks associated with the Yingke model have existed for a long time. The family business empire behind Mei Xiangrong, the long-term mixing of law firm and personal assets, and governance risks from rapid expansion together form a dual shock to the legal industry and capital markets.

Yingke’s “Brand” as a Financing Tool

Multiple investors told Ji Mian News that they purchased “investment products” promoted under the Yingke Law Firm name through “salespeople” and “lecturers,” in the form of signing so-called “Yingke Market Partner Agreements” and “Legal Service Contracts.” The involved amounts ranged from tens of thousands to over ten million yuan.

“I was attracted by the Yingke Law Firm’s brand. The salespeople promoted it in the name of the law firm,” said Wang Yun, an investor from Shanghai.

Ji Mian News found that the current contracts signed by investors mainly fall into two categories. One is the “Yingke Market Partner Supplementary Agreement,” signed by the investor, Mei Xiangrong, and Beijing Yingke Law Firm; the other is the “Legal Service Contract,” signed by the investor and Beijing Yingke Law Firm.

The receipts confirmed by Ji Mian News bear the official seal of Beijing Yingke Law Firm.

According to an internal document provided by someone close to Yingke Law Firm, the firm once launched a “Legal-Business Integration Product,” raising funds externally under the guise of “legal services and market partners,” with different investment tiers and returns set accordingly.

From the chart, the investment thresholds ranged from 100,000 to 1 million yuan, with terms of one or three years. The annual return for one-year investments was roughly 5.5% to 8.5%, while the three-year cumulative return reached 20.5% to 29.5%. This “higher amount, longer term, higher return” structure is generally seen in the industry as a typical capital-raising incentive mechanism.

Multiple investors told Ji Mian News that initially, the investment contracts were collected and replaced by salespeople around July 2025, then re-signed under the two agreements mentioned above, with the names of legal services and partners.

Documents show that the original contracts listed Shanghai Yingke Enterprise Management Company (“Yingke Enterprise Management”) as the primary signatory. Yingke Enterprise Management is a core related company of Mei Xiangrong, controlled by his sister Mei Yaping with a 95% stake. Several investors said that the funds were also received by Yingke Enterprise Management at that time.

On the afternoon of March 13, Yingke Enterprise Management’s office in Jing’an District, Shanghai, was inspected by police.

“We actually invested in Yingke Law Firm’s AI Space Station project, not in any law firm market partner,” Wang Yun said. “Around July 2025, the salespeople suddenly said we needed to re-sign the contracts. But they gave us a list of investment projects, which still listed the AI Space Station.” Another supplementary document shown by Li Yun indicated the investment target was Yingke Law Firm’s “Yingfa Bao” AI Space Station, with a three-year term.

Public information shows that “Yingfa Bao AI Legal Space Station” was independently developed by Yingke Law Firm. The device integrates IoT, new media, video interaction, and AI technologies, providing users with legal consulting, document generation, and risk assessment services.

A family member of an interviewee, Ms. Zhang, said her sister had invested nearly 8 million yuan. The initial projects were promoted under the names of “Legal Technology” and “Legal Services,” with fixed returns promised. She recalled that the promised yields at different stages ranged from about 5% to over 8% annually.

Several legal professionals told Ji Mian News that, in form, including small investors under the “Legal Service Contract” framework could make the capital inflow appear as normal business income, weakening its investment nature; larger sums, on the other hand, were handled via “Partner Agreements,” giving a nominal identity. This arrangement makes the legal relationships for different amounts appear different, but whether the actual fund properties are consistent remains controversial.

“If the same capital-raising logic is split into legal services and partnership contracts, further scrutiny of the true transaction purpose is needed,” industry insiders said. Such arrangements could be seen as a “technical” handling of fund properties. If the funds lack a real connection to the legal services and are more about fixed or quasi-fixed returns based on investment amounts, they may face compliance issues.

A lawyer who worked at Yingke Law Firm for many years said that industry insiders believe Mei Xiangrong’s financing issues “will eventually lead to trouble.”

He recalled that over ten years ago, the Yingke system had engaged in raising funds under the guise of investment projects. In Shanghai and other places, teams set up multiple limited partnerships to raise funds from investors, covering sectors like tourism and investment holdings, often using the law firm’s brand for promotion.

“Many activities were held at law firm offices, even using the law firm’s name and logo for endorsement, creating a strong credit impression,” he said. In the public eye, lawyers are seen as highly reputable, and this reputation, when used for commercial financing, easily gains trust from ordinary investors. “Few would think that a law firm system would involve such financing models, which is where the risk lies.”

He also revealed that such fundraising was not only aimed at the public but also involved internal lawyer groups. Early projects included raising funds under the names of coffee or investment funds, promising dividends.

The Mei Family’s Business Empire

Mei Xiangrong is not a law school graduate. He graduated from Tsinghua University’s Department of Automotive Engineering in 1995 and later obtained a lawyer qualification through self-study, beginning his legal career.

In 2007, when he joined Yingke, then with only 24 practicing lawyers, few could have foreseen that under his leadership, the small firm would transform over a decade into the world’s largest law firm by headcount.

A senior industry lawyer said: “When mentioning Yingke, two prominent labels come to mind: its strong marketing ability and its large scale.”

He views Mei Xiangrong more as a capital operator than a traditional practicing lawyer. “He rarely handles specific cases and focuses more on expanding the firm’s size and capital operations.” Yingke Law Firm has grown into one of China’s largest, with over 25,000 employees nationwide.

Ji Mian News learned that Mei Xiangrong’s business empire extends well beyond Yingke Law Firm. Multiple lawyers mentioned that Zhiheng Law Firm and Shuke Law Firm are also “satellite firms” of Yingke.

“Yingke’s ‘satellite law firms’ are no secret in the legal community,” said a lawyer. “But controlling a law firm often involves ‘drawer agreements,’ and sometimes even junior partners are unaware, making verification difficult.” Another lawyer recalled attending the opening of Zhiheng Law Firm in Guangdong a few years ago, where colleagues mentioned, “Mei Xiangrong is actually the controlling person of Zhiheng.”

Mei Xiangrong’s ambitions are not limited to legal services. Tianyancha shows he is associated with 40 companies, including Beijing Yingke Law Firm and Shanghai Data Port Co., Ltd. He has publicly stated multiple times: “I don’t hide the fact that I am a businessman.”

The core of his business empire is Beijing Yingke Global Holdings Co., Ltd. (“Yingke Global”), established in 2015. According to Tianyancha and reports, Yingke Global once controlled over 80 subsidiaries, with ventures spanning tourism, film, health, education, studying abroad, coffee, and even hydrogen-powered vehicles.

![Image source: Ai Qicha]

As the empire expanded, Mei Xiangrong’s family—his sister Mei Yaping and brother Mei Chunhua—began to appear more prominently.

Business registration data shows Yingke Global’s shareholding structure was repeatedly shuffled within the Mei family. Initially, Mei Xiangrong held 95%, and Mei Chunhua 5%. In December 2021, Mei Xiangrong transferred all shares to Mei Yaping, exiting as a shareholder. Currently, Mei Yaping owns 95% and is the legal representative, while Mei Chunhua holds 5% and is a supervisor.

Tianyancha shows Yingke Global controls key companies like Yingke Mechen International Travel Agency and Yingke Enterprise Management.

In January 2026, Mei Xiangrong withdrew from Beijing Xiangrong Qingneng Automotive Technology Co., Ltd., another key enterprise, with Mei Yaping as the successor. Public info indicates Xiangrong Qingneng focuses on hydrogen fuel commercial vehicles. In 2021, it announced a high-profile 10-billion-yuan leasing cooperation with Xinqiao Leasing, with Mei Xiangrong as “initiator.”

On March 17, Ji Mian News visited Xiangrong Qingneng’s office. Compared to its earlier high-profile hydrogen energy narrative, the company left behind registration, recruitment, and partnership traces but no clear project entity.

![Image source: Photo by Wang Zhen, Ji Mian News]

Xiangrong Qingneng was established in August 2021 and later renamed Beijing Xiangrong Qingneng Technology Co., Ltd. Its initial registered address was in Beijing Daxing, Fengyuan Street, No. 9 Courtyard, Building 2, Room 102, located within the hydrogen energy demonstration zone. Staff Zhu Huawei confirmed it had registered there.

During registration, the company reportedly rented a few open workspaces, paying 20,000 yuan annually. On the day of Ji Mian News’ visit, no staff was present.

In December 2021, Xiangrong Qingneng announced entry into the hydrogen fuel commercial vehicle sector. Tsinghua University’s Vehicle and Transportation College’s Dean, Professor Li Jianqiu, said they would deepen cooperation and build a technology transfer platform.

Ji Mian News attempted to contact Professor Li but received no response. Tsinghua’s college replied that “Professor Li is on a business trip and unavailable for interview.”

On November 2, 2023, Xiangrong Qingneng changed its registered address from the hydrogen demonstration zone to No. 76 Dongsi Huan Zhong Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing. Ji Mian News found that the 5th-floor elevator signage displayed “Yingke Tourism” and “Yingke Global Holdings,” but no sign of Xiangrong Qingneng’s office.

Between 2022 and 2025, Ji Mian News found two public job postings: in June 2022, for an intelligent connected vehicle (cabin) engineer, and in 2025, for a steer-by-wire chassis control engineer.

The address listed was the 18th floor of Tsinghua Tongfang Science Park, Building D. Staff there said the 18th floor has always been the office of Beijing Yingke Law Firm (Haidian District), and they had never heard of Xiangrong Qingneng.

Xiangrong Qingneng also invested in Nanjing Qingyan Yiwai New Energy Power Co., Ltd. It holds about 4.486% of the shares, with a registered capital of 162,500 yuan in 2022.

Nanjing Qingyan Yiwai said they only have an investment relationship and no cooperation, and Xiangrong Qingneng has not used their technology or participated in management. They also said Xiangrong Qingneng might exit its stake.

Business registration shows Xiangrong Qingneng had 7 employees in 2022, dropping to zero after 2023.

Who Really Owns “Yingke”?

On March 10, Beijing Yingke Law Firm held a global board meeting, appointing Li Jingwu as the new chair of the global board and China regional executive director. Mei Xiangrong no longer served as chair of the global board.

Following the incident, Yingke Law Firm emphasized that “the issue stems from companies run by his family and is unrelated to our practice activities.”

Earlier, at the beginning of the month, a clue appeared. The Beijing Justice Bureau’s official website showed that on March 2, Yingke Law Firm’s organizational form changed from a general partnership to a “special general partnership.”

On March 17, Ji Mian News contacted Li Jingwu by phone, but there was no answer. Zhao Chunyu, deputy director of Yingke China and director of Yingke Beijing Management Committee, responded that: “The law firm is very united. We are honestly and actively resolving the issues, and lawyers are very supportive of the measures taken.”

Despite Yingke Law Firm’s swift disassociation from Mei Xiangrong and his family’s takeover of related companies, the long-term confusion over the “Yingke” brand remains a hidden risk.

Several legal professionals pointed out that the long-term mixing of the Yingke brand with Mei Xiangrong and his family’s enterprises is a key factor in the trust collapse.

The core controversy lies in the separation of trademarks and ownership. “The trademark of legal services should be the law firm’s most core intangible asset, but the ownership of ‘Yingke’ has always been outside the firm’s internal circulation. This separation of rights itself is a risk,” said multiple lawyers.

Ji Mian News found that in August 2010, Yingke Law Firm applied for the “Yingke” trademark in the legal services field (No. 8353411), but the application was rejected.

Later, in September 2022, “Beijing Yingtian Kedi Intellectual Property Agency Co., Ltd.” applied for the “Yingke” trademark (No. 67202910), which was approved for registration in September 2024. The major shareholder of this company is Mei Yaping.

According to the “Lawyer Law,” engaging in profit-making activities as a lawyer or law firm is strictly restricted or prohibited.

A lawyer who previously worked at Yingke recalled that over ten years ago, internal disputes over capital operations and development directions were intense. Some core members even said Mei Xiangrong’s investment approach was too aggressive, “putting our entire assets on the line,” which caused heated arguments.

He explained that Yingke’s long-standing “partner title system” had obvious financing attributes. “The ‘Lawyer Law’ management measures only recognize ‘partners,’ but the so-called senior or equity partners are more like a form of capital raising.”

He recalled participating in related projects early on with about 150,000 yuan, earning the title of “equity partner,” with a promised annual return of about 8%. At the time, this was seen as a way to motivate both status and income. However, his “equity partner” status was different from traditional partners—he was not registered or recognized as a partner with legal governance rights under the law. In other words, this role was more of an internal title than a legally binding partnership.

He also mentioned signing an agreement that the “partner’s rights” under his name would be exercised by Mei Xiangrong. This meant that, in practice, the rights were largely concentrated in Mei Xiangrong.

This incident also brought the governance and rapid expansion issues of the law firm into public discussion.

A week before the “Yingke explosion” news broke, lawyer Yang Lin from Beijing had a deep talk with a global partner of Yingke. “Everyone feels that Boss Mei has been a bit reckless these years.” The combined number of lawyers in the second and third largest firms still lagged far behind Yingke.

He pointed out that Yingke’s “headquarters-led + branch system” makes decision-making and capital highly centralized. “It’s nominally a partnership, but in practice, it’s closer to single control.” Although some branches are independently accounted for, they lack real autonomy in major investments and fund management, meaning risks from core financial issues could propagate to branches.

Law firms usually have clear withdrawal rules and cycles, with centralized settlement of attorney fees, some of which can only be withdrawn after case closure, creating capital deposits.

Lawyer Huang Jun, who practiced at Yingke and interned there, said that large law firms’ scale operations often lead to long-term capital accumulation in firm accounts. “If it’s purely legal work, it’s fine. But if they pursue diversification, risks increase,” he said.

Yang Lin believed that after the incident, Yingke might face lawyer attrition and client loss, making recovery difficult. “It’s somewhat like a bank run—once trust cracks, it’s very hard to restore.”

Recently, Yingke changed from a “general partnership” to a “special general partnership.” The former requires all partners to bear unlimited joint liability, while the latter isolates fault, with only at-fault partners bearing unlimited liability, and others responsible only up to their capital share.

On the legal responsibility front, Liu Chang believed that simply “cutting off personal actions” from the firm wouldn’t fully resolve the issue. “If actions are taken in the firm’s name and stamped, it’s hard to completely dissociate the firm’s responsibility,” he said. Adjusting partnership structures or liability after the fact usually cannot retroactively affect past actions. Whether unregistered partners should bear civil liability is also a current controversy.

Currently, Beijing Justice Bureau and Beijing Lawyers Association have launched investigations at Yingke Beijing headquarters. An insider told Ji Mian News that Mei Xiangrong has already turned himself in.

The widespread “Yingke storm” remains unresolved, with issues including investor asset recovery and future industry compliance still to be clarified.

(Names like Wang Yun, Yang Lin, Liu Chang, Huang Jun are pseudonyms at interviewees’ request.)