"Bypassing" the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi oil exports "recover over half," but can this "Plan B" hold up?

The Strait of Hormuz is nearly closed, and Saudi Arabia has used a pipeline that crosses the desert interior with a 45-year history to restore oil exports to over 60% of pre-war levels. The International Energy Agency (IEA) calls this a “historic-scale supply disruption” in the oil market, and this pipeline provides a critical buffer. However, this bypass route is not a safe passage; it merely shifts the risk from one choke point to another.

According to ship tracking data compiled by Bloomberg, over the past five days, oil exports from Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port in the Red Sea have averaged about 4.19 million barrels per day, roughly 60% of the pre-war daily average of about 7 million barrels, a significant increase from the pre-war level of around 1.4 million barrels per day. The peak daily volume has reached 4.65 million barrels three times. Reuters, citing LSEG shipping data, reports that Yanbu’s loading capacity is expected to reach a record 3.8 million barrels per day in March. Currently, at least 32 supertankers and Suezmax vessels are queuing offshore Yanbu to load, with more ships en route.

Saudi Arabia is the only Gulf country with a substantial alternative export route. Its East-West Pipeline has a maximum capacity of 7 million barrels per day, allowing it to maintain exports relatively independently even as neighbors like Iraq and Kuwait cut production significantly. Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser confirmed in early March that the pipeline would reach full capacity within days.

The core risk of this “Plan B” is that it shifts the geopolitical exposure of oil exports from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab al-Mandab Strait— a narrow waterway at the southern end of the Red Sea, largely controlled by Houthi forces on the Yemen side. Analysts warn that if the Houthis intervene in the current conflict and disrupt Yanbu port or the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the global energy market could face renewed pressure.

Pipeline Acceleration: Chemical Boost for “Extreme Sprint”

The alternative route Saudi Arabia is using was built in 1981 as an east-west oil pipeline, originally designed to respond to the Gulf “tanker war” during the Iran-Iraq conflict—providing a backup route if the Strait of Hormuz became uncontrollable. This approximately 1,200-kilometer pipeline traverses the desert interior, ending at the Red Sea port of Yanbu, with a total capacity of 7 million barrels per day, of which about 5 million barrels per day are available for export, and the rest supplied to domestic refineries.

To push beyond physical limits, Aramco has taken additional measures. According to two industry sources cited by Reuters, Aramco is injecting a chemical called “drag-reducing agent” (DRA) into the pipeline— a technology that reduces internal fluid friction, increasing flow by over 30%. This method has been widely used in Europe to counteract sanctions on Russian oil. The sources say Saudi Arabia currently has ample supplies of this chemical.

Exports Rise: Saudi Arabia Dominates “Backup Channel”

Latest data shows initial signs of success for this bypass route. Bloomberg ship tracking indicates Yanbu port exports have steadily increased since the conflict began, with March daily levels significantly higher than January’s 1.3 million barrels and February’s 1.4 million barrels. About 70 tankers are expected to complete loading at Yanbu this month, with around 40 still en route.

In contrast, other Gulf oil producers are in a more passive position. The UAE has a pipeline to the Gulf of Oman, but its Fujairah port has been repeatedly forced to halt operations due to drone attacks, affecting route stability. Iraq and Kuwait have few alternatives and have already been forced to cut production. The IEA describes this conflict as the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market, and Saudi Arabia’s pipeline has become the most critical single infrastructure supporting global energy markets.

New Choke Point: Geopolitical Risks in the Bab al-Mandab Strait

While the east-west pipeline successfully bypasses Hormuz, it introduces the export route into another geopolitically sensitive area.

About 90% of the oil loaded at Yanbu is carried by Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs). These ships, when fully laden, cannot pass through the Suez Canal due to draft restrictions and must traverse the Bab al-Mandab Strait to reach Asian and other major markets. Analysts estimate that about 70-75% of Yanbu’s exports are potentially exposed to risks in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), roughly 6% of global seaborne oil flows through this waterway.

Eurasia Group senior analyst and Iran oil historian Gregory Brew states, “The threat from the Houthis is real.” “If they attack Yanbu and cause significant damage, you could see a daily interruption of 7 million barrels of exports,” he said.

Some exports could be rerouted via another route—north from Yanbu to Egypt’s Ain Sukhna port, then through the Suez-Mediterranean (Sumed) pipeline to the Mediterranean. Analysts estimate this channel can carry about 2 to 2.5 million barrels per day, but this capacity is far below the total Yanbu exports. According to the latest data from the Western Naval Information Center (JMIC), shipping traffic through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab has returned to normal levels, with about 40 ships passing in the past 24 hours, and no new security incidents reported.

Houthi Forces: Strategic Restraint or Waiting to Intervene

The Houthis have not officially declared involvement in the current conflict, but their leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi stated clearly in a televised speech on March 5, “Regarding military escalation and actions, our finger is always on the trigger; when the situation demands, we can mobilize.”

Analysts have differing views on why the Houthis have not yet acted. Ahmed Nagi, senior analyst on Yemen at the International Crisis Group, considers their restraint a strategic calculation rather than a lack of capacity. “Iran seems to be gradually managing the situation, keeping the Houthis as a reserve force,” Nagi said. “In this sense, the Houthis are a card that can be played later, especially considering their ability to disrupt Red Sea shipping and create broader economic and security pressures.” He added, “Their current restraint appears more like timing than unwillingness to fight.”

Gregory Brew offers another perspective based on the Houthis’ own situation: after sustained strikes by the U.S. and Israel, their military strength has been significantly depleted, and their finances are under pressure. “I think their current financial and military situation will restrain them from launching large-scale hostile actions,” he said.

Both views point to the same reality: for the global energy market, the stability of the Bab al-Mandab Strait is increasingly a key variable in whether Saudi Arabia’s “Plan B” can continue to operate—and this is something Riyadh cannot control alone.