Two Major Deals in Two Days: GLP-1 Battlefield Dynamics Shift Dramatically as Giants Accelerate "Buy Buy Buy" Strategy

2026年春节后，全球 metabolic disease drug development field feels particularly restless.

On February 24, Pfizer China and Hangzhou Xianweida Bio announced a strategic partnership, with Pfizer obtaining exclusive commercialization rights in mainland China for the next-generation biased GLP-1 receptor agonist Enopeglutide injection, in a deal worth up to $495 million. Just one day later, on February 25, Danish giant Novo Nordisk announced a $2.1 billion collaboration with U.S. biotech company Vivtex to develop next-generation oral medications for obesity and diabetes.

Two major deals within two days, driven by two completely different strategic logics, both point to a hot GLP-1 track. As the “battle of the twin kings” between semaglutide and tirzepatide in 2025 unfolds, domestic Chinese pharmaceutical companies’ generic drug armies are also approaching. These nearly simultaneous BD (business development) cases are not mere coincidental news collages but key signals of the global GLP-1 market’s structural change—old patterns loosening, new wars already underway.

Regarding the current competition in the GLP-1 field, a securities industry analyst told 21st Century Business Herald that recent moves by two major multinational pharmaceutical companies (MNCs) have cast two heavy “trailblazing stones” into the hot GLP-1 track, reflecting industry deep adjustments and strategic rebalancing after rapid growth.

On one hand, seeking new engines for the “throne.” Facing Eli Lilly’s tirzepatide topping sales charts and CagriSema’s slight underperformance in key Phase III data, Novo Nordisk is eager to break free from reliance on existing technologies. Its $2.1 billion partnership with Vivtex focuses on overcoming oral delivery technical bottlenecks. Currently, oral semaglutide is limited by SNAC technology, with low bioavailability and complex processes. Novo Nordisk aims to introduce cutting-edge external platforms to reserve core technology for next-generation oral products— a classic “defensive offense” to consolidate its early lead in the oral track and prevent being overtaken by Lilly’s small-molecule oral drugs.

On the other hand, leveraging domestic innovation. Unlike Novo Nordisk’s “forward-looking technology,” Pfizer’s strategy is more pragmatic and urgent. After repeated setbacks in R&D pipelines, Pfizer is rapidly “catching up” through frequent BD deals. The choice of Xianweida’s Enopeglutide is based on its product certainty and huge market potential in China. This marks a shift for multinational pharma companies in China from “independent R&D” to a “light-asset” model of “external introduction + local commercialization,” integrating local pharma R&D efficiency with their own strong market access and sales networks for quick market positioning.

“Behind these two deals is a fundamental shift in GLP-1 industry logic. Market capacity is still expanding rapidly, but the logic of market share distribution has evolved from a simple ‘efficacy race’ to a comprehensive competition of ‘technology platform + commercialization ecosystem,’” said the analyst.

From R&D failures to “buy, buy, buy”

Pfizer’s move is both high-profile and pragmatic. According to the agreement, Pfizer gains exclusive commercialization rights in mainland China for Xianweida’s Enopeglutide, while Xianweida retains the marketing authorization holder status, responsible for R&D, manufacturing, and supply.

The cleverness of this deal lies in its “division of labor” design. For Pfizer, it is a precise “shortcoming补” move. Over the past two years, Pfizer’s independent R&D in GLP-1 has faced repeated setbacks. In April 2025, Pfizer announced the termination of its oral GLP-1 agonist Danuglipron (PF-06882961), which was under study for chronic weight management. This was yet another setback in Pfizer’s weight-loss drug efforts. Previously, Pfizer had also halted studies on two other oral GLP-1 drugs, Lotiglipron and Danuglipron (twice daily). Pfizer’s announcement indicated that dose optimization studies for Danuglipron (once daily, NCT06567327 and NCT06568731) achieved key pharmacokinetic targets, and early studies on twice-daily Danuglipron suggested that a formulation and dose could provide competitive efficacy and tolerability in Phase III trials.

However, Danuglipron (once daily) failed to overcome safety issues. Data from over 1,400 subjects showed that liver enzyme elevations were similar to other GLP-1 drugs. One dose-optimization study reported a case of asymptomatic potential drug-induced liver injury, which resolved after discontinuation.

After reviewing all data, including clinical trial results and regulatory feedback, Pfizer decided to terminate development of this molecule.

“Pfizer’s failure highlights the high risks of oral small-molecule GLP-1 development. Danuglipron was discontinued due to a case of drug-induced liver injury, and another oral drug, Lotiglipron, was also halted due to transaminase elevations,” the analyst pointed out. Pfizer’s exit opens space for competitors like Lilly, Novo Nordisk, and AstraZeneca, and also serves as a warning: safety is a critical threshold for the commercialization of oral drugs.

Due to side effects, the development of oral small-molecule GLP-1 drugs Lotiglipron and Danuglipron has nearly halted their pipelines. Facing what could be one of the largest markets in pharmaceutical history—weight-loss drugs—Pfizer cannot accept “absence.” Therefore, 2025 has become Pfizer’s “buy-up” year in this track: first, a $4.9 billion prepayment to acquire GLP-1 company Metsera in September; then, in December, a deal with Chinese firm Tongyong Pharmaceutical for oral small-molecule GLP-1R agonists; now, a partnership with Xianweida.

For Xianweida, this is undoubtedly a “timely rain.” According to its IPO prospectus, as of June 30, 2025, Xianweida Bio’s redemption liabilities reached 2.9 billion yuan, mainly from external financing and accumulated interest. In revenue, from 2023 to mid-2025, the company only earned 91.07 million yuan from licensing and collaborations in the first half of 2025, with no operating income in the previous two years.

With its Hong Kong IPO facing hurdles, its core product about to launch amid fierce competition, handing commercialization to a multinational giant like Pfizer not only alleviates urgent funding needs but also boosts market confidence ahead of the IPO.

This is a “marriage of mutual benefit,” revealing a typical survival path for China’s biotech: rather than fighting in the red ocean alone, it’s better to hand over the fruit to giants and realize early profits.

“Defensive offense”! $2.1 billion bet

If Pfizer’s deal is an offensive market positioning, then Novo Nordisk’s collaboration with Vivtex reveals more of a defender’s anxiety.

Just days before announcing the partnership, Novo Nordisk released data from Phase III REDEFINE 4: after 84 weeks of treatment, its drug CagriSema showed a 23% weight loss, but still less than Lilly’s tirzepatide’s 25.5%. CagriSema is a fixed-dose combination of long-acting cagrilintide and semaglutide, administered weekly via subcutaneous injection, with an weight management application submitted to the FDA in December 2025. Meanwhile, in the 2025 “drug king” race, Lilly’s tirzepatide achieved $36.507 billion in sales, slightly surpassing Novo Nordisk’s semaglutide at $36.1 billion, claiming the global crown.

To break through, on February 25, Novo Nordisk launched two major moves: first, cutting the prices of Ozempic and Wegovy in the U.S. by up to 50%. Starting January 1, 2027, the monthly prices for Ozempic and Wegovy will be $675, halving Wegovy’s current price and reducing Ozempic’s price by 34%. The price cuts also apply to their oral versions, including Rybelsus; second, announcing a $2.1 billion collaboration with Vivtex, betting on next-generation oral drugs. Under the agreement, Vivtex will license its proprietary oral delivery technology to Novo Nordisk, aiming to solve poor GI absorption of biopharmaceutical candidates.

This is a defensive tech arms race. It’s well known that injectables are effective but patient compliance remains a bottleneck. Whoever can make breakthroughs in oral formulations will truly tap into the hundreds of millions of “needle-phobic” market segments. For Novo Nordisk, the $2.1 billion gamble is a bet on the future high ground of drug delivery technology over the next decade. Meanwhile, the significant price cuts are a preemptive strike against upcoming patent cliffs and generic waves.

“Oralization will determine the next phase of dominance. The market education for injectables is complete; future growth depends on the compliance benefits of oral formulations. Novo Nordisk and Lilly’s arms race in oral small molecules is already intense. Novo Nordisk’s move aims to stay ahead in the generational shift of oral technology. Whoever first overcomes the delivery challenge of oral large-molecule drugs will seize the trillion-dollar market opportunity,” the analyst added. Currently, in the GLP-1 market, China shows a unique “dual pursuit”: domestic companies like Innovent and Xianweida are exporting innovative drugs, attracting giants like Pfizer; meanwhile, global giants like Novo Nordisk are partnering with local firms like United Laboratories to preempt the upcoming biosimilar battles. This indicates China is no longer just a consumer market but an essential innovation hub and production base in the global GLP-1 industry chain.

By 2026, semaglutide will lose patent exclusivity in multiple markets, including China, where over ten companies like Livzon, CSPC, and Huadong Medicine are already preparing generics. Novo Nordisk’s move aims to exchange price for market share, and time for space.

From “duopoly” to “many heroes rising”

Looking at these two BD events from a broader perspective, a clear conclusion emerges: the GLP-1 market is rapidly shifting from the “duopoly” stage of Novo Nordisk and Lilly to an era of multiple contenders vying for dominance.

On February 3, Novo Nordisk released its 2025 financial report: total revenue of 309.064 billion Danish kroner (~$48.9 billion), up 6%; net profit of 102.434 billion kroner (~$16.2 billion), up 1%. Semaglutide, its “flagship product,” contributed $36.1 billion in sales, over 10% growth. Subsequently, Lilly announced its 2025 Q4 and full-year results: total revenue of $65.179 billion, up 44%. The key driver was its GLP-1 drug tirzepatide, which contributed $36.5 billion, securing the global “king” title for 2025.

Meanwhile, in China, price wars have already begun. Public data shows that on Meituan’s platform, the latest price for tirzepatide 2.4ml:10mg “Mufenda” dropped to 559 yuan, down 40 yuan from the previous minimum of 599 yuan. Novo Nordisk’s semaglutide prices remain around 300-400 yuan on various platforms. Domestic brands like Innovent’s Mastepide (0.5ml:2mg/box) dropped from 540 yuan to 399 yuan; 0.5ml:4mg/box from 890 to 770 yuan. Yinuo Medicine’s B Esupalglutide injection (1mg/0.5ml) sells for 273 yuan per 2 vials, and 3mg/0.5ml for 489 yuan, marked as “Number 1 in diabetes drug discounts.”

It’s clear that competition in the GLP-1 market will evolve from a single product race to a three-dimensional war involving technology routes, cost control, and business models.

In pricing, with patent cliffs and generics flooding in, price reductions are inevitable. Novo Nordisk’s 50% price cut in the U.S. is just the beginning; in China, insurance negotiations will force all players to revisit pricing logic. GLP-1 drugs are moving from “luxury drugs” to affordable chronic disease management medicines.

In business models, fully vertical integration of “R&D + commercialization” faces challenges. The Pfizer-Xianweida partnership—local biotech responsible for R&D and manufacturing, with a multinational handling commercialization—may become a mainstream template. This not only alleviates localization pain points for MNCs but also compensates for Chinese biotech’s funding and commercialization gaps.

Some analysts predict Novo Nordisk may spend up to $35 billion this year on acquisitions. Where will this money go? Likely toward companies with differentiated technologies, especially oral delivery tech and multi-target pipelines. The giants’ “buy, buy, buy” spree is far from over—it’s just beginning.

What’s certain is that for Novo Nordisk, the $2.1 billion bet is a reinforcement of the “throne”; for Pfizer, the $495 million partnership is a belated entry; for the industry, it signals that as semaglutide’s era enters its second half, a new cycle is beginning.

In this cycle, there are no eternal kings—only continuous technological iteration and capital battles. For patients, the giants’ anxiety may be the prelude to affordable, high-quality drugs arriving.