China's All-Nuke Sub Push May Trigger An Undersea Arms Race

(MENAFN- Asia Times) China’s shift toward an all-nuclear submarine fleet could extend its strategic reach from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean while spurring a broader regional buildup of nuclear-powered undersea forces.

This month, the US Navy’s intelligence chief, Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, testified before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) that China is undertaking a major shift toward building an all-nuclear submarine fleet as part of a broader effort to strengthen its undersea warfare capabilities and expand blue-water naval power.

According to Brookes, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which operates more than 60 submarines in total, including roughly 50 conventional diesel-electric boats (SSK) and a smaller number of nuclear-powered attack (SSN) and ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN), is transitioning away from conventional submarines toward a predominantly nuclear construction program to support sustained operations, strategic deterrence and sea-lane interdiction.

He notes that this shift marks a fundamental departure from China’s earlier reliance on large numbers of conventional submarines, reflecting the view that nuclear propulsion offers greater endurance, range, and operational flexibility for competition with the US and allied navies.

Brookes also says China has expanded submarine production infrastructure across three major shipyards, tripling construction hall capacity and more than doubling production capability to sustain higher output of advanced nuclear boats through the 2030s.

He mentions that a new class of smaller nuclear attack submarines sometimes referred to as the Type 041“Zhou-class” is being developed to perform regional patrol and presence missions at lower cost than larger attack submarines.

At the same time, next-generation Type 095 SSGNs and Type 096 SSBNs expected in the late 2020s and 2030s will incorporate quieter reactors, improved sensors and longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), enabling China to maintain survivable deterrent patrols from protected waters closer to home, Brookes says.

Despite those advances, China may still be facing challenges in upscaling its nuclear submarine production base.

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As Sarah Kirchberger notes in a September 2023 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), China’s submarine industrial base still faces significant technological challenges in propulsion systems and acoustic quieting, areas in which Western and Russian submarines remain more advanced.

She notes that Chinese engineers have struggled with vibration suppression, noise reduction, and sound-absorbing coatings, factors that contribute to comparatively higher acoustic signatures.

Nevertheless, an all-nuclear submarine fleet could give China the capability to escort its carrier strike groups (CSGs) out into the Pacific, threaten US carriers operating beyond the First Island Chain to dissuade US and allied intervention in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, and enable continuous SSBN patrols within heavily defended bastions in the South China Sea for second-strike nuclear capability.

Beyond those applications, an all-nuclear submarine force could project China’s power into the Indian Ocean. China might use nuclear submarines to threaten India’s sea-based deterrent. China and India have longstanding border disputes in the Himalayas, marked by skirmishes and the potential for full-scale conflict between nuclear-armed states.

According to a March 2025 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) report, India plans to field four Arihant-class SSBNs, with the lead boat, INS Arihant, armed with 12 Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of about 700 kilometers-limited to targets in western or southwestern China when launched from protected bastions in the Bay of Bengal.

However, the NTI report notes that Arihant’s successors, including INS Arighat, could be armed with the longer-range K-4 SLBM, with a range of roughly 3,500 kilometers, enabling strikes against targets deep inside mainland China.

Hence, China could use its SSNs to shadow India’s SSBNs in the Bay of Bengal, much as the US Navy’s SSNs possibly shadow China’s SSBNs in the South China Sea.

Underscoring that possibility, in 2013, a Chinese SSN completed a patrol in the Indian Ocean and sailed all the way to the Gulf of Aden, showing the endurance needed for long-range patrols in regions with limited resupply options.

Still, China faces geographic barriers to accessing the Indian Ocean, requiring passage through strategic chokepoints such as the Malacca, Lombok, Sunda, and Ombai Straits.

The Malacca Strait’s shallow depth and heavy traffic complicate covert submarine transit. The Sunda Strait’s even shallower depth, strong currents, and obstacles such as sandbars and oil platforms make passage difficult. While the Lombok (~250 meters deep) and Ombai (~3,000 meters deep) Straits allow submerged transit, limited hydrological data complicates navigation.

China’s push for an all-nuclear submarine fleet could spur similar efforts in India and other Pacific countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

Similar to China, India’s upcoming Project 77 SSNs could escort its SSBNs in its Bay of Bengal bastions, escort its CSGs in the Indian Ocean, support long-range strike operations with submarine-launched cruise missiles, and deter adversaries from deploying naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

Aside from India, Japan and South Korea could take notice of China’s efforts to build an all-nuclear submarine fleet. As noted by John Bradford and other writers in a November 2025 report for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Japan and South Korea are reconsidering their longstanding reliance on advanced conventional submarines amid a deteriorating regional security environment and the expansion of military capabilities among potential adversaries.

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Bradford and others mention that both Japan and South Korea are exploring nuclear-powered submarines because they offer greater speed, endurance, and operational flexibility for long-distance patrols and sea-lane defense. However, they point out that cost, manpower requirements, and political constraints remain major obstacles.

Regarding South Korea, Bradford and others say the country faces fewer domestic political barriers but must resolve nuclear fuel restrictions under its 2015 agreement with the US. As for Japan, they say it must overcome domestic opposition to military uses of nuclear technology before pursuing such submarines.

In the case of Australia, the future of its AUKUS nuclear submarine program with the US and UK seems uncertain.

A January 2026 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report outlines an alternative arrangement in which the US could retain additional Virginia-class submarines rather than selling three to five boats to Australia, with US submarines operating from Australian bases and performing missions that Australian SSNs would otherwise undertake.

Under this approach, the report says that US and UK nuclear submarines would still rotate through Western Australia, while Australia could focus resources on other capabilities supporting the alliance.

Whether China ultimately succeeds in fielding a fully nuclear-powered submarine fleet may therefore shape not only the future balance of undersea power in the Indo-Pacific but also trigger a wider regional contest beneath the waves as rivals adapt their own submarine strategies in response.

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