Oil Prices Surge: Has the Global Energy Order Completely Collapsed?

The situation in Iran is still unfolding, with uncertainties spreading across various sectors, primarily affecting energy. Especially the Strait of Hormuz — this vital “artery” of global energy — any disturbance there immediately triggers a chain reaction in the markets.

How can we ensure a sense of “certainty” and security?

Recently, a set of data has drawn attention:

The Strait of Hormuz accounts for one-fifth of global oil transportation and one-fifth of liquefied natural gas trade worldwide. About 80% of Japanese oil tankers must pass through this strait, and over 40% of China’s crude oil imports also go through it.

Some analysts say that if conflicts persist, these countries “lack the capacity to buffer such shocks.”

The implication is that, regardless of whether the strait is physically closed, the security risks have already deterred or prevented most international oil tankers from passing. Oil produced by Gulf countries cannot be exported, leading directly to severe shortages for energy-importing nations.

Is it really that simple?

Professor Wang Xu from Beijing Foreign Studies University, who specializes in maritime routes, told Tan Zhu:

Long-term blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would have widespread negative impacts and is neither politically nor economically in Iran’s best interests. That’s why, historically, this strait has never been permanently cut off. Iran’s recent statements and actions regarding the blockade reflect this objective reality.

Furthermore, from the perspective of “energy survival,” even if the Strait of Hormuz were bypassed, global supply and economic operations would not come to an abrupt halt. The real impact of the strait’s risks is on higher-level issues such as global economic operating costs and growth expectations.

Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries are already planning alternative routes to bypass the strait.

｜｜ Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline.

From the Abqaiq oil processing center directly to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, with a designed capacity of 5 million barrels per day, primarily to export oil via the Red Sea, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.

｜｜ UAE’s Abu Dhabi Pipeline.

From the Habshan oil field directly to the port of Fujeirah on the east coast, with a designed capacity of 1.5 million barrels per day, also intended to bypass the Strait of Hormuz when necessary.

Meanwhile, transportation through routes via the Cape of Good Hope, the Danish Strait, the Turkish Strait, and the Panama Canal is increasing, and supply from non-Gulf regions is also rising.

While these routes cannot fully replace the Strait of Hormuz, they can alleviate short-term pressure. This also indicates that the global energy landscape is evolving toward diversification and decentralization.

Specifically, regarding energy-importing countries:

How can they enhance their rapid recovery capabilities in the face of uncertainty to hedge risks?

Tan Zhu found that China is already building systemic buffer and adaptation capabilities.

For example, diversifying imports to mitigate the “choke point dilemma.”

China’s crude oil import sources have reached 49 countries. Meanwhile, the entire energy transportation network is highly diversified:

｜｜ Three overland pipelines—China-Russia, China-Kazakhstan, China-Myanmar—effectively disperse maritime risks;

｜｜ The China-Russia East Line natural gas pipeline has an annual capacity of 38 billion cubic meters, and the upcoming “Siberia Force 2” will add an additional 50 billion cubic meters annually;

｜｜ The Arctic route’s future normalization allows bypassing traditional channels, shortening transit times and avoiding the Middle East’s geopolitical hotspots.

This diversification is not only to cope with supply disruptions but also to expand bargaining power—whoever controls more flexible transportation routes is more likely to hedge against vulnerabilities at specific geographic nodes, manage risk premiums amid market turbulence, and keep overall energy import costs within strategic safety margins.

Beyond building defenses, a more crucial step is to actively participate in maritime security governance and influence the underlying rules, thereby shifting the geopolitical game.

This rule-setting influence is not just wishful thinking but rooted in China’s unique influence as a major power. A detail: over three months ago, China officially inaugurated its Permanent Mission to the International Maritime Organization, marking China’s deepening involvement in shaping global maritime rules.

This influence manifests practically during crises.

Tan Zhu observed that in recent days, some ships have still passed smoothly through the Strait of Hormuz. One vessel, during transit, changed its Automatic Identification System (AIS) destination from “Pending” to “Chinese shipowner.”

“Transit dividends” are a tangible reflection of political influence. They prove that China’s call for communication and negotiation is not empty talk but a real “hard currency” that can effectively reduce shipping risks.

Wang Xu told Tan Zhu that the security interests of global maritime routes are inseparable, and international cooperation is needed. China is an important contributor to security governance and is expected by the world to play a greater role. If the security situation worsens further, China could consider coordinating energy import and export parties within multilateral frameworks and initiating a more inclusive joint escort mechanism.

In this ultimate test of energy resilience, China is not only a participant but also a builder. This is not only a responsibility of a major power but also the strongest demonstration of the concept of “resilience.”