#合约诈骗与虚假网站 Seeing the $250,000 phishing incident involving ZEROBASE, I feel frustrated again. I’m all too familiar with this scam—front-end attacks, malicious contracts disguised convincingly, and users granting permissions that leave them completely vulnerable. The most painful part is that such incidents are fundamentally hard to prevent.

But there are a few details worth everyone remembering. First, the Vault contract on the BSC chain that managed to deceive so many people indicates that most users haven't even developed the habit of checking contract addresses. Comparing the address starting with 0x0dd2 to the official genuine contract, this isn’t some advanced scam technique. Second, a single loss of $123,000 shows that some people simply don’t practice risk management; their approval limits are set to unlimited.

What I want to emphasize most is—tools like revoke.cash are now widespread, but how many people actively revoke permissions? Most either don’t know about these tools or are just hoping for the best. Those who have been in the space long enough understand one truth: every permission you grant is a ticking time bomb. Unless you’re interacting with an active contract, all other permissions should be revoked.

Although ZEROBASE’s incident wasn’t directly the project’s fault, it also exposes a problem—that security education within the ecosystem is still too weak. Don’t wait until you get exploited to learn how to protect yourself.